Legal questions such as fiduciary capacity must have fact findings as foundation for proper analysis
The Court of Appeal of Alberta has dismissed a sexual assault victim's claim, finding that though the defendant was a leader of the church where the assault took place, the victim was unable to demonstrate any intentional wrongdoing on the part of the church leader himself which would ground a cause of action of tort.
In Wallace v Faith Community Church of God North East Calgary, 2021 ABCA 351, the appellant said that she was sexually assaulted by Kevin Smith, a leader in the Faith Church music ministry. Smith was removed from Canada by immigration authorities after his visa expired. She filed a claim against the respondents, claiming that being the employer and a person in a position of authority, they were under the duty to assist and remedy the situation when they became aware of the assaults.
The trial judge ruled that while the appellant “displayed a desire to tell the truth as she believed it,” and presented expert witnesses to show she had suffered trauma, he was “not satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the appellant had been sexually assaulted by Mr. Smith.” Even if this was true, the trial judge found that neither of the respondents played any role in the alleged assault and dismissed the appellant’s claim.
On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in concluding that she failed to demonstrate an intentional wrongdoing by the respondent that would ground a cause of action of the tort of battery.
The Court of Appeal disagreed.
The Court ruled that, first, the appellant was merely attempting to re-argue the case, which is not the role of an appellate court. Second, the trial judge’s findings of fact and any inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to deference. The Court also ruled that it was not necessary for the trial judge to address legal questions such as the respondents’ breach of fiduciary capacity or vicarious liability because the fact findings of the trial judge had removed the foundation of any proper analysis of these legal questions.
“A court must always be concerned about the proper scope of its law-making function when there is no established factual platform on which to appropriately adjudicate on the legal questions,” said the Court.
