He challenged his sister's acquisitions, arguing that they should be part of their father's estate
The BC Supreme Court has granted a son the right to commence legal proceedings in the name of his deceased father and his estate to prevent diminishment of the estate’s value.
In Chappell v Chappell, 2024 BCSC 268, Allan Chappell, who passed away at the age of 87, left behind a will that designated his estate to be divided equally among his three children should his wife, Arlene, predecease him. With Arlene having died in 2015, the children—Laurie, Brenda, and Gerald—were named joint executors, trustees, and equal beneficiaries of Allan's estate.
The core of the dispute lies in assets Brenda acquired before and after Allan's death, including real estate in Nanaimo, a substantial bank account, and retirement funds, all totalling a significant value. Gerald challenged these acquisitions, arguing they should be considered part of Allan's estate and subject to the will's provisions for equal distribution among the siblings.
The BC Supreme Court decided to grant leave for Gerald to proceed with the lawsuit based on a thorough examination of the legal principles underpinning estate law in British Columbia. The court found Gerald's case arguable, meaning it has a reasonable prospect of success and is not bound to fail. This assessment considered various factors, including the plausibility of a mutual wills agreement between Allan and Arlene, the presumption of resulting trust to the disputed assets, and concerns regarding Allan's mental capacity at the time of the transactions in question.
Significantly, the court also determined that Gerald acted in good faith, a crucial requirement under Wills, Estates and Succession Act (WESA). Despite Brenda's claims to the contrary, the court interpreted Gerald's motivations as aligned with the lawsuit's objectives—to rectify what he perceived as wrongful transactions that diminished the estate's value to the detriment of the rightful beneficiaries.
Brenda argued that the court has a residual discretion to deny leave, even if the statutory preconditions are fully met. She claimed that the court should not grant leave because Gerald has not provided a workable litigation plan, and Laurie, as a “neutral beneficiary,” opposed Gerald’s application.
However, the court was not persuaded that the absence of a litigation plan or Laurie’s opposition to the action was grounds to refuse leave. The court was satisfied that Gerald had presented an arguable case and had established that it was necessary or expedient for leave to be granted and that leave should be granted. Furthermore, the court was satisfied that Gerald had a good faith purpose in advancing the case.
